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Income-Tax Department
By far the most important development in income-tax matters during
the current year is the decision of the United States supreme court in the
case Eisner vs. Macomber, judgment in which was delivered March 8, 1920.
This case is based upon the contention of the government that under the
1916 revenue laws stock dividends were taxable to the recipients. The
opinion of the supreme court, delivered by Justice Pitney, disposed of the
government contention and followed the lines of the court’s decision in
Towne vs. Eisner under the 1913 law.
Dissenting opinions were delivered by Justices Brandeis, Holmes and
Day.
The final decision of this long-discussed question will have a permanent
bearing upon all future tax legislation and administration. One immediate
effect is found in the number of stock dividends which have been declared
since the handing down of the decision and the many others which are
confidently expected in the near future.
In view of the significance of the matter we publish in full the judgment
of the court, followed by the opinions of the dissenting justices.
A more extended comment upon the decision and its effect upon admin
istration of the law will appear in the Income-Tax Department next month.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Mark Eisner, as Collector of United '
States Internal Revenue for the
Third District of the State of New
York, Plaintiff in Error,
vs.

Myrtle H. Macomber.

[March 8, 1920]
Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court
This case presents the question whether, by virtue of the sixteenth
amendment, congress has the power to tax, as income of the stockholder
and without apportionment, a stock dividend made lawfully and in good
faith against profits accumulated by the corporation since March 1, 1913.
It arises under the revenue act of September 8, 1916 (Ch. 463, 39 Stat.
756, et seq.), which, in our opinion (notwithstanding a contention of the
government that will be noticed), plainly evinces the purpose of congress
to tax dividends as income.
The facts, in outline, are as follows:
On January 1, 1916, the Standard Oil Company of California, a cor
poration of that state, out of an authorized capital stock of $100,000,000,
had shares of stock outstanding, par value $100 each, amounting in round
figures to $50,000,000. In addition, it had surplus and undivided profits
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invested in plant, property and business and required for the purposes of the
corporation, amounting to about $45,000,000, of which about $20,000,000 had
been earned prior to March 1, 1913, the balance thereafter. In January, 1916,
in order to readjust the capitalization, the board of directors decided to issue
additional shares sufficient to constitute a stock dividend of 50 per cent of
the outstanding stock, and to transfer from surplus account to capital stock
account an amount equivalent to such issue. Appropriate resolutions were
adopted, an amount equivalent to the par value of the proposed new stock
was transferred accordingly, and the new stock duly issued against it and
divided among the stockholders.
Defendant in error, being the owner of 2,200 shares of the old stock,
received certificates for 1,100 additional shares, of which 18.07 per cent, or
198.77 shares, par value $19,877, were treated as representing surplus earned
between March 1, 1913, and January 1, 1916. She was called upon to pay,
and did pay under protest, a tax imposed under the revenue act of 1916,
based upon a supposed income of $19,877 because of the new shares; and
an appeal to the commissioner of internal revenue having been disallowed,
she brought action against the collector to recover the tax. In her complaint
she alleged the above facts, and contended that in imposing such a tax the
revenue act of 1916 violated Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3, and Art. I, sec. 9, cl. 4, of
the constitution of the United States, requiring direct taxes to be ap
portioned according to population, and that the stock dividend was not
income within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. A general demurrer
to the complaint was overruled upon the authority of Towne v. Eisner, 245
U. S. 418; and, defendant having failed to plead further, final judgment went
against him. To review it the present writ of error is prosecuted.
The case was argued at the last term, and reargued at the present term,
both orally and by additional briefs.
We are constrained to hold that the judgment of the district court must
be affirmed: first, because the question at issue is controlled by Towne v.
Eisner, supra; secondly, because a reexamination of the question, with the
additional light thrown upon it by elaborate arguments, has confirmed the
view that the underlying ground of that decision is sound, that it disposes of
the question here presented, and that other fundamental considerations lead
to the same result.
In Towne v. Eisner, the question was whether a stock dividend made
in 1914 against surplus earned prior to January 1, 1913, was taxable against
the stockholder under the act of October 3, 1913 (Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166),
which provided (sec. B, p. 167) that the net income should include “divi
dends,” and also “gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatever.” Suit having been brought by a stockholder to recover the tax
assessed against him by reason of the dividend, the district court sustained
a demurrer to the complaint. 242 Fed. Rep. 702. The court treated the
construction of the act as inseparable from the interpretation of the sixteenth
amendment; and, having referred to Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,
158 U. S. 601, and quoted the amendment, proceeded very properly to say
(p. 704) : “It is manifest that the stock dividend in question cannot be
reached by the income-tax act, and could not, even though congress expressly
declared it to be taxable as income, unless it is in fact income.” It declined,
however, to accede to the contention that in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S.
549, “stock dividends” had received a definition sufficiently clear to be con
trolling, treated the language of this court in that case as obiter dictum in
respect to the matter then before it (p. 706), and examined the question as
res nova, with the result stated. When the case came here, after overruling
a motion to dismiss made by the government upon the ground that the only
question involved was the construction of the statute and not its constitution
ality, we dealt upon the merits with the question of construction only,
but disposed of it upon consideration of the essential nature of a stock
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dividend, disregarding the fact that the one in question was based upon
surplus earnings that accrued before the sixteenth amendment took effect.
Not only so, but we rejected the reasoning of the district court, saying
(245 U. S., p. 426) : “Notwithstanding the thoughtful discussion that the
case received below we cannot doubt that the dividend was capital as well
for the purposes of the income-tax law as for distribution between tenant
for life and remainderman. What was said by this court upon the latter
question is equally true for the former. ‘A stock dividend really takes
nothing from the property of the corporation, and adds nothing to the
interests of the shareholders. Its property is not diminished, and their
interests are not increased. . . . The proportional interest of each share
holder remains the same. The only change is in the evidence which repre
sents that interest, the new shares and the original shares together represent
ing the same proportional interest that the original shares represented
before the issue of the new ones.’ Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, 559,
560. In short, the corporation is no poorer and the stockholder is no richer
than they were before. Logan County v. United States, 169 U. S. 255, 261.
If the plaintiff gained any small advantage by the change, it certainly was
not an advantage of $417,450, the sum upon which he was taxed. . . .
What has happened is that the plaintiff’s old certificates have been split up
in effect and have diminished in value to the extent of the value of the new.”
This language aptly answered not only the reasoning of the district court
but the argument of the solicitor general in this court, which discussed the
essential nature of a stock dividend. And if, for the reasons thus expressed,
such a dividend is not to be regarded as “income” or “dividends” within the
meaning of the act of 1913, we are unable to see how it can be brought
within the meaning of “incomes” in the sixteenth amendment; it being very
clear that congress intended in that act to exert its power to the extent per
mitted by the amendment. In Towne v. Eisner it was not contended that
any construction of the statute could make it narrower than the constitu
tional grant; rather the contrary.
The fact that the dividend was charged against profits earned before the
act of 1913 took effect, even before the amendment was adopted, was neither
relied upon nor alluded to in our consideration of the merits in that case.
Not only so, but had we considered that a stock dividend constituted income
in any true sense, it would have been held taxable under the act of 1913,
notwithstanding it was based upon profits earned before the amendment.
We ruled at the same term, in Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339, that a cash
dividend extraordinary in amount, and in Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347,
that a dividend paid in stock of another company, were taxable as income
although based upon earnings that accrued before adoption of the amend
ment. In the former case, concerning “corporate profits that accumulated
before the act took effect,” we declared (pp. 343-344) : “Just as we deem
the legislative intent manifest to tax the stockholder with respect to such
accumulations only if and when, and to the extent that, his interest in them
comes to fruition as income, that is, in dividends declared, so we can per
ceive nd constitutional obstacle that stands in the way of carrying out this
intent when dividends are declared out of a preexisting surplus. . . .
Congress was at liberty under the amendment to tax as income, without
apportionment, everything that became income, in the ordinary sense of the
word, after the adoption of the amendment, including dividends received in
the ordinary course by a stockholder from a corporation, even though they
were extraordinary in amount and might appear upon analysis to be a mere
realization in possession of an inchoate and contingent interest that the
stockholder had in a surplus of corporate assets previously existing.” In
Peabody v. Eisner (pp. 349-350), we observed that the decision of the
district court in Towne v. Eisner had been reversed “only upon the ground
that it related to a stock dividend which in fact took nothing from the
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property of the corporation and added nothing to the interest of the
shareholder, but merely changed the evidence which represented that in
terest”; and we distinguished the Peabody case from the Towne case upon
the ground that “the dividend of Baltimore & Ohio shares was not a stock
dividend but a distribution in specie of a portion of the assets of the Union
Pacific.”
Therefore, Towne v. Eisner cannot be regarded as turning upon the point
that the surplus accrued to the company before the act took effect and before
adoption of the amendment. And what we have quoted from the opinion in
that case cannot be regarded as obiter dictum, it having furnished the entire
basis for the conclusion reached. We adhere to the view then expressed,
and might rest the present case there; not because that case in terms decided
the constitutional question, for it did not; but because the conclusion there
reached as to the essential nature of a stock dividend necessarily prevents
its being regarded as income in any true sense.
Nevertheless, in view of the importance of the matter, and the fact that
congress in the revenue act of 1916 declared (39 Stat. 757) that a “stock
dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of its cash value,” we
will deal at length with the constitutional question, incidentally testing the
soundness of our previous conclusion.
The sixteenth amendment must be construed in connection with the
taxing clauses of the original constitution and the effect attributed to them
before the amendment was adopted. In Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust
Co., 158 U. S. 601, under the act of August 27, 1894 (Ch. 349, sec. 27, 28
stat. 509, 553), it was held that taxes upon rents and profits of real estate
and upon returns from investments of personal property were in effect direct
taxes upon the property from which such income arose, imposed by reason
of ownership; and that congress could not impose such taxes without
apportioning them among the states according to population, as required by
art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3, and sec. 9, cl. 4, of the original constitution.
Afterwards, and evidently in recognition of the limitation upon the
taxing power of congress thus determined, the sixteenth amendment was
adopted, in words lucidly expressing the object to be accomplished: “The
congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from what
ever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.” As repeatedly held, this did
not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the neces
sity which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the states of
taxes laid on income. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S.
1, 17-19; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103, 112 et seq.; Peck &
Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165, 172-173.
A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language, re
quires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose construction,
so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of the
constitution that require an apportionment according to population for direct
taxes upon property, real and personal. This limitation still has an appro
priate and important function, and is not to be overridden by congress or
disregarded by the courts.
In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article I of the constitu
tion may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the amend
ment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential
to distinguish between what is and what is not “income,” as the term is there
used; and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and
substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may
adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the constitution,
from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limita
tions alone that power can be lawfully exercised.
The fundamental relation of “capital” to “income” has been much dis
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cussed by economists, the former being likened to the tree or the land, the
latter to the fruit or the crop; the former depicted as a reservoir supplied
from springs, the latter as the outlet stream, to be measured by its flow
during a period of time. For the present purpose we require only a clear
definition of the term “income,” as used in common speech, in order to
determine its meaning in the amendment; and, having formed also a correct
judgment as to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find it easy to decide
the matter at issue.
After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard
Diet.; Webster’s Internat. Diet.; Century Diet.), we find little to add to
the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the corporation
tax act of 1909 (Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415;
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185)—“Income may be defined
as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,”
provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or con
version of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle case (pp.
183, 185).
Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute
of income essential for a correct solution of the present controversy. The
government, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted,
placed chief emphasis upon the word “gain,” which was extended to include
a variety of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was
either overlooked or misconceived. “Derived—from—capital” ;—“the gain
—derived—from—capital,” etc. Here we have the essential matter: not
a gain accruing to capital, not a growth or increment of value in the invest
ment ; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from
the property, severed from the capital however invested or employed, and
coming in, being “derived,” that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the
taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal;—that is income derived
from property. Nothing else answers the description.
The same fundamental conception is clearly set forth in the sixteenth
amendment—“incomes, from whatever source derived”—the essential thought
being expressed with a conciseness and lucidity entirely in harmony with the
form and style of the constitution.
Can a stock dividend, considering its essential character, be brought
within the definition ? To answer this, regard must be had to the nature of
a corporation and the stockholder’s relation to it. We refer, of course, to
a corporation such as the one in the case at bar, organized for profit, and
having a capital stock divided into shares to which a nominal or par value
is attributed.
Certainly the interest of the stockholder is a capital interest, and his
certificates of stock are but the evidence of it. They state the number of
shares to which he is entitled and indicate their par value and how the stock
may be transferred. They show that he or his assignors, immediate or
remote, have contributed capital to the enterprise, that he is entitled to a
corresponding interest proportionate to the whole, entitled to have the prop
erty and business of the company devoted during the corporate existence to
attainment of the common objects, entitled to vote at stockholders’ meetings,
to receive dividends out of the corporation’s profits if and when declared,
and, in the event of liquidation, to receive a proportionate share of the net
assets, if any, remaining after paying creditors. Short of liquidation, or
until dividend declared, he has no right to withdraw any part of either
capital or profits from the common enterprise; on the contrary, his interest
pertains not to any part, divisible or indivisible, but to the entire assets,
business and affairs of the company. Nor is it the interest of an owner,
since the corporation has full title, legal and equitable, to the whole. The
stockholder has the right to have the assets employed in the enterprise, with
the incidental rights mentioned; but, as stockholder, he has no right to with
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draw, only the right to persist, subject to the risks of the enterprise, and
looking only to dividends for his return. If he desires to dissociate himself
from the company he can do so only by disposing of his stock.
For bookkeeping purposes the company acknowledges a liability in form
to the stockholders equivalent to the aggregate par value of their stock,
evidenced by a “capital stock account.” If profits have been made and not
divided they create additional bookkeeping liabilities under the head of
“profit and loss,” “undivided profits,” “surplus account,” or the like. None
of these, however, gives to the stockholders as a body, much less to any
one of them, either a claim against the going concern for any particular sum
of money, or a right to any particular portion of the assets or any share in
them unless or until the directors conclude that dividends shall be made and
a part of the company’s assets segregated from the common fund for the
purpose. The dividend normally is payable in money, under exceptional
circumstances in some other divisible property; and when so paid, then only
(excluding, of course, a possible advantageous sale of his stock or winding-up
of the company) does the stockholder realize a profit or gain which becomes
his separate property, and thus derive income from the capital that he or his
predecessor has invested.
In the present case, the corporation had surplus and undivided profits
invested in plant, property and business, and required for the purposes of
the corporation, amounting to about $45,000,000, in addition to outstanding
capital stock of $50,000,000. In this the case is not extraordinary. The
profits of a corporation, as they appear upon the balance-sheet at the end of
the year, need not be in the form of money on hand in excess of what is
required to meet current liabilities and finance current operations of the
company. Often, especially in a growing business, only a part, sometimes a
small part, of the year’s profits is in property capable of division; the
remainder having been absorbed in the acquisition of increased plant, equip
ment, stock in trade, or accounts receivable, or in decrease of outstanding
liabilities. When only a part is available for dividends, the balance of the
year’s profits is carried to the credit of undivided profits, or surplus, or some
other account having like significance. If thereafter the company finds itself
in funds beyond current needs it may declare dividends out of such surplus
or undivided profits; otherwise it may go on for years conducting a suc
cessful business, but requiring more and more working capital because of
the extension of its operations, and therefore unable to declare dividends
approximating the amount of its profits. Thus the surplus may increase
until it equals or even exceeds the par value of the outstanding capital stock.
This may be adjusted upon the books in the mode adopted in the case at
bar—by declaring a “stock dividend.” This, however, is no more than a
book adjustment, in essence not a dividend but rather the opposite; no part
of the assets of the company is separated from the common fund, nothing
distributed except paper certificates that evidence an antecedent increase in
the value of the stockholder’s capital interest resulting from an accumula
tion of profits by the company, but profits so far absorbed in the business
as to render it impracticable to separate them for withdrawal and dis
tribution. In order to make the adjustment, a charge is made against surplus
account with corresponding credit to capital stock account, equal to the pro
posed “dividend”; the new stock is issued against this and the certificates
delivered to the existing stockholders in proportion to their previous holdings.
This, however, is merely bookkeeping that does not. affect the aggregate
assets of the corporation or its outstanding liabilities; it affects only the
form, not the essence, of the “liability” acknowledged by the corporation to
its own shareholders, and this through a readjustment of accounts on one
side of the balance-sheet only, increasing “capital stock” at the expense of
“surplus”; it does not alter the preexisting proportionate interest of any
stockholder or increase the intrinsic value of his holding or of the aggregate
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holdings of the other stockholders as they stood before. The new certificates
simply increase the number of the shares, with consequent dilution of the
value of each share.
A “stock dividend” shows that the company’s accumulated profits have
been capitalized, instead of distributed to the stockholders or retained as
surplus available for distribution in money or in kind should opportunity
offer. Far from being a realization of profits of the stockholder, it tends
rather to postpone such realization, in that the fund represented by the new
stock has been transferred from surplus to capital, and no longer is available
for actual distribution.
The essential and controlling fact is that the stockholder has received
nothing out of the company’s assets for his separate use and benefit; on
the contrary, every dollar of his original investment, together with whatever
accretions and accumulations have resulted from employment of his money
and that of the other stockholders in the business of the company, still
remains the property of the company, and subject to business risks which
may result in wiping out the entire investment. Having regard to the very
truth of the matter, to substance and not to form, he has received nothing
that answers the definition of income within the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment.
Being concerned only with the true character and effect of such a dividend
when lawfully made, we lay aside the question whether in a particular case
a stock dividend may be authorized by the local law governing the corpora
tion, or whether the capitalization of profits may be the result of correct
judgment and proper business policy on the part of its management, and a
due regard for the interests of the stockholders. And we are considering
the taxability of bona tide stock dividends only.
We are clear that not only does a stock dividend really take nothing
from the property of the corporation and add nothing to that of the share
holder, but that the antecedent accumulation of profits evidenced thereby,
while indicating that the shareholder is the richer because of an increase of
his capital, at the same time shows he has not realized or received any income
in the transaction.
It is said that a stockholder may sell the new shares acquired in the
stock dividend; and so he may, if he can find a buyer. It is equally true that
if he does sell, and in doing so realizes a profit, such profit, like any other, is
income, and so far as it may have arisen since the sixteenth amendment is
taxable by congress without apportionment. The same would be true were
he to sell some of his original shares at a profit. But if a shareholder sells
dividend stock he necessarily disposes of a part of his capital interest, just
as if he should sell a part of his old stock, either before or after the dividend.
What he retains no longer entitles him to the same proportion of future
dividends as before the sale. His part in the control of the company likewise
is diminished. Thus, if one holding $60,000 out of a total $100,000 of the
capital stock of a corporation should receive in common with other stock
holders a 50 per cent stock dividend, and should sell his part, he thereby
would be reduced from a majority to a minority stockholder, having sixfifteenths instead of six-tenths of the total stock outstanding. A cor
responding and proportionate decrease in capital interest and in voting power
would befall a minority holder should he sell dividend stock; it being in
the nature of things impossible for one to dispose of any part of such an
issue without a proportionate disturbance of the distribution of the entire
capital stock, and a like diminution of the seller’s comparative voting power
—that “right preservative of rights” in the control of a corporation. Yet,
without selling, the shareholder, unless possessed of other resources, has
not the wherewithal to pay an income tax upon the dividend stock. Nothing
could more clearly show that to tax a stock dividend is to tax a capital
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increase, and not income, than this demonstration that in the nature of things
it requires conversion of capital in order to pay the tax.
Throughout the argument of the government, in a variety of forms, runs
the fundamental error already mentioned—a failure to appraise correctly
the force of the term “income” as used in the sixteenth amendment, or at
least to give practical effect to it. Thus, the government contends that the
tax “is levied on income derived from corporate earnings,” when in truth
the stockholder has “derived” nothing except paper certificates which, so far
as they have any effect, deny him present participation in such earnings. It
contends that the tax may be laid when earnings “are received by the stock
holder,” whereas he has received none; that the profits are “distributed by
means of a stock dividend,” although a stock dividend distributes no profits;
that under the act of 1916 “the tax is on the stockholder’s share in corporate
earnings,” when in truth a stockholder has no such share, and receives none
in a stock dividend; that “the profits are segregated from his former capital,
and he has a separate certificate representing his invested profits or gains,”
whereas there has been no segregation of profits, nor has he any separate
certificate representing a personal gain, since the certificates, new and old,
are alike in what they represent—a capital interest in the entire concerns of
the corporation.
We have no doubt of the power or duty of a court to look through the
form of the corporation and determine the question of the stockholder’s
right, in order to ascertain whether he has received income taxable by con
gress without apportionment. But, looking through the form, we cannot
disregard the essential truth disclosed; ignore the substantial difference be
tween corporation and stockholder; treat the entire organization as unreal;
look upon stockholders as partners, when they are not such; treat them as
having in equity a right to a partition of the corporate assets, when they
have none; and indulge the fiction that they have received and realized a
share of the profits of the company, which in truth they have neither re
ceived nor realized. We must treat the corporation as a substantial entity
separate from the stockholder, not only because such is the practical fact
but because it is only by recognizing such separateness that any dividend—
even one paid in money or property—can be regarded as income of the stock
holder. Did we regard corporation and stockholders as altogether identical,
there would be no income except as the corporation acquired it; and while
this would be taxable against the corporation as income under appropriate
provisions of law, the individual stockholders could not be separately and
additionally taxed with respect to their several shares even when divided,
since if there were entire identity between them and the company they could
not be regarded as receiving anything from it, any more than if one’s money
were to be removed from one pocket to another.
Conceding that the mere issue of a stock dividend makes the recipient
no richer than before, the government nevertheless contends that the new
certificates measure the extent to which the gains accumulated by the cor
poration have made him the richer. There are two insuperable difficulties
with this: In the first place, it would depend upon how long he had held
the stock whether the stock dividend indicated the extent to which he had
been enriched by the operations of the company; unless he had held it
throughout such operations the measure would not hold true. Secondly, and
more important for present purposes, enrichment through increase in value
of capital investment is not income in any proper meaning of the term.
The complaint contains averments respecting the market prices of stock
such as plaintiff held, based upon sales before and after the stock dividend,
tending to show that the receipt of the additional 1,100 shares did not sub
stantially change the market value of her entire holdings. This tends to
show that in this instance market quotations reflected intrinsic values—a
thing they do not always do. But we regard the market prices of the
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securities as an unsafe criterion in an inquiry such as the present, when
the question must be, not what will the thing sell for, but what is it in
truth and in essence.
It is said there is no difference in principle between a simple stock divi
dend and a case where stockholders use money received as cash dividends
to purchase additional stock contemporaneously issued by the corporation.
But an actual cash dividend, with a real option to the stockholder either to
keep the money for his own or to reinvest it in new shares, would be as far
removed as possible from a true stock dividend, such as the one we have
under consideration, where nothing of value is taken from the company’s
assets and transferred to the individual ownership of the several stock
holders and thereby subjected to their disposal.
The government’s reliance upon the supposed analogy between a dividend
of the corporation’s own shares and one made by distributing shares owned
by it in the stock of another company, calls for no comment beyond the
statement that the latter distributes assets of the company among the share
holders while the former does not; and for no citation of authority except
Peabody vs. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347, 349-350.
Two recent decisions, proceeding from courts of high jurisdiction, are
cited in support of the position of the government.
Swan Brewery Co., Ltd. v. Rex [1914], A. C. 231, arose under the Divi
dend Duties Act of Western Australia, which provided that “dividend”
should include “every dividend, profit, advantage, or gain intended to be paid
or credited to or distributed among any members or directors of any com
pany,” except, etc. There was a stock dividend, the new shares being
allotted among the shareholders pro rata; and the question was whether this
was a distribution of a dividend within the meaning of the act. The judicial
committee of the privy council sustained the dividend duty upon the ground
that, although “in ordinary language the new shares would not be called a
dividend, nor would the allotment of them be a distribution of a dividend,”
yet, within the meaning of the act, such new shares were an “advantage” to
the recipients. There being no constitutional restriction upon the action of
the lawmaking body, the case presented merely a question of statutory con
struction, and manifestly the decision is not a precedent for the guidance
of this court when acting under a duty to test an act of congress by the
limitations of a written constitution having superior force.
In Tax Commissioner v. Putnam (1917), 227 Mass. 522, it was held that
the 44th amendment to the constitution of Massachusetts, which conferred
upon the legislature full power to tax incomes, “must be interpreted as in
cluding every item which by any reasonable understanding can fairly be
regarded as income” (pp. 526, 531) ; and that under it a stock dividend was
taxable as income, the court saying (p. 535) : “In essence, the thing which
has been done is to distribute a symbol representing an accumulation of
profits, which instead of being paid out in cash is invested in the business,
thus augmenting its durable assets. In this aspect of the case the substance
of the transaction is no different from what it would be if a cash dividend
had been declared with the privilege of subscription to an equivalent amount
of new shares.” We cannot accept this reasoning. Evidently, in order to
give a sufficiently broad sweep to the new taxing provision, it was deemed
necessary to take the symbol for the substance, accumulation for distribution,
capital accretion for its opposite; while a case where money is paid into the
hand of the stockholder with an option to buy new shares with it, followed
by a hypothetical acceptance of the option, was regarded as identical in
substance with a case where the stockholder receives no money and has no
option. The Massachusetts court was not under an obligation, like the one
which binds us, of applying a constitutional amendment in the light of other
constitutional provisions that stand in the way of extending it by con
struction.
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Upon the second argument, the government, recognizing the force of the
decision in Towne v. Eisner, supra, and virtually abandoning the contention
that a stock dividend increases the interest of the stockholder or otherwise
enriches him, insisted as an alternative that by the true construction of the
act of 1916 the tax is imposed not upon the stock dividend but rather upon
the stockholder’s share of the undivided profits previously accumulated by
the corporation; the tax being levied as a matter of convenience at the time
such profits become manifest through the stock dividend. If so construed,
would the act be constitutional?
That congress has power to tax shareholders upon their property in
terests in the stock of corporations is beyond question; and that such interests
might be valued in view of the condition of the company, including its
accumulated and undivided profits, is equally clear. But that this would be
taxation of property because of ownership, and hence would require ap
portionment under the provisions of the constitution, is settled beyond
peradventure by previous decisions of this court.
The government relies upon Collector v. Hubbard (1870), 12 Wall. 1, 17,
which arose under sec. 117 of the act of June 30, 1864 (Ch. 173; 13 Stat.
223, 282), providing that “the gains and profits of all companies, whether
incorporated or partnership, other than the companies specified in this
section, shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income
of any person entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise.” The
court held an individual taxable upon his proportion of the earnings of a
corporation although not declared as dividends and although invested in
assets not in their nature divisible. Conceding that the stockholder for
certain purposes had no title prior to dividend declared, the court neverthe
less said (p. 18) : “Grant all that, still it is true that the owner of a share
of stock in a corporation holds the share with all its incidents, and that
among those incidents is the right to receive all future dividends; that is,
his proportional share of all profits not then divided. Profits are incident
to the share to which the owner at once becomes entitled provided he
remains a member of the corporation until a dividend is made. Regarded as
an incident to the shares, undivided profits are property of the shareholder,
and as such are the proper subject of sale, gift or devise. Undivided profits
invested in real estate, machinery, or raw material for the purpose of being
manufactured are investments in which the stockholders are interested, and
when such profits are actually appropriated to the payment of the debts of
the corporation they serve to increase the market value of the shares,
whether held by the original subscribers or by assignees.” In so far as this
seems to uphold the right of congress to tax without apportionment a stock
holder’s interest in accumulated earnings prior to dividend declared, it must
be regarded as overruled by Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158
U. S. 601, 627, 628, 637. Conceding Collector v. Hubbard was inconsistent
with the doctrine of that case, because it sustained a direct tax upon property
not apportioned among the states, the government nevertheless insists that the
sixteenth amendment removed this obstacle, so that now the Hubbard case
is authority for the power of congress to levy a tax on the stockholder’s
share in the accumulated profits of the corporation even before division by
the declaration of a dividend of any kind. Manifestly this argument must
be rejected, since the amendment applies to income only, and what is called
the stockholder’s share in the accumulated profits of the company is capital,
not income. As we have pointed out, a stockholder has no individual share
in accumulated profits, nor in any particular part of the assets of the cor
poration, prior to dividend declared.
Thus, from every point of view, we are brought irresistibly to the con
clusion that neither under the sixteenth amendment nor otherwise has con
gress power to tax without apportionment a true stock dividend made law
fully and in good faith, or the accumulated profits behind it, as income of
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the stockholder. The revenue act of 1916, in so far as it imposes a tax upon
the stockholder because of such dividend, violates the provisions of article
I, section 2, clause 3, and article I, section 9, clause 4, of the constitution,
and to this extent is invalid notwithstanding the sixteenth amendment.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the following opinion:
Financiers, with the aid of lawyers, devised long ago two different
methods by which a corporation can, without increasing its indebtedness, keep
for corporate purposes accumulated profits, and yet, in effect, distribute
these profits among its stockholders. One method is a simple one. The
capital stock is increased; the new stock is paid up with the accumulated
profits; and the new shares of paid-up stock are then distributed among the
stockholders pro rata as a dividend. If the stockholder prefers ready money
to increasing his holding of the stock in the company, he sells the new stock
received as a dividend. The other method is slightly more complicated.
Arrangements are made for an increase of stock to be offered to stock
holders pro rata at par and, at the same time, for the payment of a cash
dividend equal to the amount which the stockholder will be required to pay
to the company, if he avails himself of the right to subscribe for his pro
rata of the new stock. If the stockholder takes the new stock, as is ex
pected, he may endorse the dividend check to the corporation and thus pay
for the new stock. In order to ensure that all the new stock so offered will
be taken, the price at which it is offered is fixed far below what it is be
lieved will be its market value. If the stockholder prefers ready money to
an increase of his holdings of stock, he may sell his right to take new stock
pro rata, which is evidenced by an assignable instrument. In that event the
purchaser of the rights repays to the corporation, as the subscription price
of the new stock, an amount equal to that which it had paid as a cash divi
dend to the stockholder.
Both of these methods of retaining accumulated profits while in effect
distributing them as a dividend had been in common use in the United
States for many years prior to the adoption of the sixteenth amendment.
They were recognized equivalents. Whether a particular corporation em
ployed one or the other method was determined sometimes by requirements
of the law under which the corporation was organized; sometimes it was
determined by preferences of the individual officials of the corporation; and
sometimes by stock market conditions. Whichever method was employed
the resultant distribution of the new stock was commonly referred to as a
stock dividend. How these two methods have been employed may be illus
trated by the action in this respect (as reported in Moody’s Manual, 1918
Industrial, and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle), of some of the
Standard Oil companies, since the disintegration pursuant to the decision
of this court in 1911. Standard Oil Co. v United States, 221 U. S. 1.
(a) Standard Oil Co. (of Indiana), an Indiana corporation. It had
on December 31, 1911, $1,000,000 capital stock (all common), and a large
surplus. On May 15, 1912, it increased its capital stock to $30,000,000, and
paid a simple stock dividend of 2900 per cent in stock.
(b) Standard Oil Co. (of Nebraska), a Nebraska corporation. It had
on December 31, 1911, $600,000 capital stock (all common), and a substan
tial surplus. On April 15, 1912, it paid a simple stock dividend of 33⅓ per
cent., increasing the outstanding capital to $800,000. During the calendar
year 1912 it paid cash dividends aggregating 20 per cent; but it earned con
siderably more, and had at the close of the year again a substantial surplus.
On June 20, 1913, it declared a further stock dividend of 25 per cent, thus
increasing the capital to $1,000,000.
(c) The Standard Oil Co. (of Kentucky), a Kentucky corporation.
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It had on December 31, 1913, $1,000,000 capital stock (all common) and
$3,701,710 surplus. Of this surplus $902,457 had been earned during the
calendar year 1913, the net profits of that year having been $1,002,457 and
the dividends paid only $100,000 (10 per cent). On December 22, 1913, a
cash dividend of $200 per share was declared payable on February 14, 1914,
to stockholders of record January 31, 1914; and these stockholders were
offered the right to subscribe for an equal amount of new stock at par and
to apply the cash dividend in payment therefor. The outstanding stock was
thus increased to $3,000,000. During the calendar years 1914, 1915 and 1916,
quarterly dividends were paid on this stock at an annual rate of between
15 per cent and 20 per cent, but the company’s surplus increased by $2,347,614,
so that on December 31, 1916, it had a large surplus over its $3,000,000
capital stock. On December 15, 1916, the company issued a circular to
the stockholders, saying:
“The company’s business for this year has shown a very good increase
in volume and a proportionate increase in profits, and it is estimated that
by January 1, 1917, the company will have a surplus of over $4,000,000. The
board feels justified in stating that if the proposition to increase the capital
stock is acted on favorably, it will be proper in the near future to declare a
cash dividend of 100 per cent; and to allow the stockholders the privilege
pro rata according to their holdings, to purchase the new stock at par, the
plan being to allow the stockholders, if they desire, to use their cash divi
dend to pay for the new stock.”
The increase of stock was voted. The company then paid a cash dividend
of 100 per cent, payable May 1, 1917, again offering to such stockholders
the right to subscribe for an equal amount of new stock at par and to apply
the cash dividend in payment therefor.
Moody’s Manual, describing the transaction with exactness, says first
that the stock was increased from $3,000,000 to $6,000,000, “a cash dividend
of 100 per cent, payable May 1, 1917, being exchanged for one share of new
stock, the equivalent of a 100 per cent stock dividend.” But later in the
report giving, as customary in the Manual, the dividend record of the
company, the Manual says: “A stock dividend of 200 per cent was paid
February 14, 1914, and one of 100 per cent on May 1, 1917.” And in report
ing specifically the income account of the company for a series of years
ending December 31, covering net profits, dividends paid and surplus for the
year, it gives as the aggregate of dividends for the year 1917, $660,000
(which was the aggregate paid on the quarterly cash dividend—5 per cent
January and April; 6 per cent July and October) ; and adds in a note:
“In addition a stock dividend of 100 per cent was paid during the year.”
The Wall Street Journal of May 2, 1917, p. 2, quotes the 1917 “High” price
for Standard Oil of Kentucky as “375 Ex. Stock Dividend.”
It thus appears that among financiers and investors the distribution of
the stock by whichever method effected is called a stock dividend; that the
two methods by which accumulated profits are legally retained for corporate
purposes and at the same time distributed as dividends are recognized by
them to be equivalents; and that the financial results to the corporation and
to the stockholders of the two methods are substantially the same—unless a
difference results from the application of the federal income tax law.
Mrs. Macomber, a citizen and resident of New York, was, in the year
1916, a stockholder in the Standard Oil Company (of California), a cor
poration organized under the laws of California and having its principal
place of business in that state. During that year she received from the
company a stock dividend representing profits earned since March 1, 1913.
The dividend was paid by direct issue of the stock to her according to the
simple method described above, pursued also by the Indiana and Nebraska
companies. In 1917 she was taxed under the federal law on the stock divi
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dend so received at its par value of $100 a share, as income received during
the year 1916. Such a stock dividend is income as distinguished from capital,
both under the law of New York and under the law of California; because
in both states every dividend representing profits is deemed to be income
whether paid in cash or in stock. It had been so held in New York, where
the question arose as between life-tenant and remainderman, Lowery v.
Farmers Loan & Trust Company, 172 N. Y. 137; Matter of Osborne, 209
N. Y. 450; and also, where the question arose in matters of taxation;
People v. Glynn, 130 N. Y. App. Div. 332; 198 N. Y. 605. It has been so
held in California, where the question appears to have arisen only in con
troversies between life-tenant and remainderman. Estate of Duffill, 58 Cal.
Dec. 97; 183 Pac. 337.
It is conceded that if the stock dividend paid to Mrs. Macomber had been
made by the more complicated method pursued by the Standard Oil Company
of Kentucky; that is, issuing rights to take new stock pro rata and paying
to each stockholder simultaneously a dividend in cash sufficient in amount
to enable him to pay for this pro rata of new stock to be purchased—the
dividend so paid to him would have been taxable as income, whether he
retained the cash or whether he returned it to the corporation in payment
for his pro rata of new stock. But it is contended that, because the simple
method was adopted of having the new stock issued direct to the stockholders
as paid-up stock, the new stock is not to be deemed income, whether she
retained it or converted it into cash by sale. If such a different result can
flow merely from the difference in the method pursued, it must be because
congress is without power to tax as income of the stockholder either the
stock received under the latter method or the proceeds of its sale; for
congress has, by the provisions in the revenue act of 1916, expressly de
clared its purpose to make stock dividends, by whichever method paid,
taxable as income.
The sixteenth amendment proclaimed February 25, 1913, declares:
“The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states
and without regard to any census or enumeration.”
The revenue act of September 8, 1916, c. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 757, provided:
“That the term ‘dividends’ as used in this title shall be held to mean any
distribution made or ordered to be made by a corporation, . . . out of
its earnings or profits accrued since March first, nineteen hundred and
thirteen, and payable to its shareholders, whether in cash or in stocks of
the corporation . . . which dividend shall be considered income, to the
amount of its cash value.”
Hitherto powers conferred upon congress by the constitution have been
liberally construed, and have been held to extend to every means appropriate
to attain the end sought. In determining the scope of the power the sub
stance of the transaction, not its form, has been regarded. Martin v.
Hunter, 1, Wheaton 304, 326; McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316,
407, 415; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton 419, 446; Craig v. Missouri, 4
Pet. 410, 433: Jarrolt v. Moberly, 103 U. S. 580, 585, 587; Legal Tender
Case, 110 U. S. 421, 444; Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, III U. S. 53, 58; United
States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427, 440, 441, 442; South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U. S. 437, 448-9. Is there anything in the phraseology of the
sixteenth amendment or in the nature of corporate dividends which should
lead to a departure from these rules of construction and compel this court
to hold, that congress is powerless to prevent a result so extraordinary as
that here contended for by the stockholder?
First: The term “income,” when applied to the investment of the stock
holder in a corporation, had, before the adoption of the sixteenth amendment,
been commonly understood to mean the returns from time to time received
by the stockholder from gains or earnings of the corporation. A dividend
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received by a stockholder from a corporation may be either in distribution
of capital assets or in distribution of profits. Whether it is the one or the
other is in no way affected by the medium in which it is paid, nor by the
method or means through which the particular thing distributed as a dividend
was procured. If the dividend is declared payable in cash, the money with
which to pay it is ordinarily taken from surplus cash in the treasury. But
(if there are profits legally available for distribution and the law under
which the company was incorporated so permits) the company may raise the
money by discounting negotiable paper; or by selling bonds, scrip or stock
of another corporation then in the treasury; or by selling its own bonds,
scrip or stock then in the treasury; or by selling its own bonds, scrip or stock
issued expressly for that purpose. How the money shall be raised is wholly
a matter of financial management. The manner in which it is raised in no
way affects the question whether the dividend received by the stockholder is
income or capital; nor can it conceivably affect the question whether it is
taxable as income.
Likewise whether a dividend declared payable from profits shall be paid
in cash or in some other medium is also wholly a matter of financial man
agement. If some other medium is decided upon, it is also wholly a question
of financial management whether the distribution shall be, for instance, in
bonds, scrip or stock of another corporation or in issues of its own. And
if the dividend is paid in its own issues, why should there be a difference in
result dependent upon whether the distribution was made from such securities
then in the treasury or from others to be created and issued by the company
expressly for that purpose? So far as the distribution may be made from
its own issues of bonds, or preferred stock created expressly for the pur
pose, it clearly would make no difference in the decision of the question
whether the dividend was a distribution of profits, that the securities had to
be created expressly for the purpose of distribution. If a dividend paid in
securities of that nature represents a distribution of profits congress may, of
course, tax it as income of the stockholder. Is the result different where the
security distributed is common stock?
Suppose that a corporation having power to buy and sell its own stock,
purchases, in the interval between its regular dividend dates, with monies
derived from current profits, some of its own common stock as a tem
porary investment, intending at the time of purchase to sell it before the
next dividend date and to use the proceeds in paying dividends, but later,
deeming it inadvisable either to sell this stock or to raise by borrowing the
money necessary to pay the regular dividend in cash, declares a dividend
payable in this stock—can anyone doubt that in such a case the dividend in
common stock would be income of the stockholder and constitutionally tax
able as such? See Green v. Bissell, 79 Conn. 547; Leland v. Hayden, 102
Mass. 542. And would it not likewise be income of the stockholder subject
to taxation if the purpose of the company in buying the stock so distributed
had been from the beginning to take it off the market and distribute it among
the stockholders as a dividend, and the company actually did so ? And pro
ceeding a short step further: Suppose that a corporation decided to capi
talize some of its accumulated profits by creating additional common stock
and selling the same to raise working capital, but after the stock has been
issued and certificates therefor are delivered to the bankers for sale, general
financial conditions make it undesirable to market the stock, and the company
concludes that it is wiser to husband, for working capital, the cash which it
had intended to use in paying stockholders a dividend, and, instead, to pay
the dividend in the common stock which it had planned to sell: Would not
the stock so distributed be a distribution of profits—and, hence, when re
ceived, be income of the stockholder and taxable as such? If this be con
ceded, why should it not be equally income of the stockholder, and taxable
as such, if the common stock created by capitalizing profits had been originally
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created for the express purpose of being distributed as a dividend to the
stockholder who afterwards received it?
Second: It has been said that a dividend payable in bonds or preferred
stock created for the purpose of distributing profits may be income and
taxable as such, but that the case is different where the distribution is in
common stock created for that purpose. Various reasons are assigned for
making this distinction. One is that the proportion of the stockholder’s own
ership to the aggregate number of the shares of the company is not changed
by the distribution. But that is equally true where the dividend is paid in
its bonds or in its preferred stock. Furthermore, neither maintenance nor
change in the proportionate ownership of a stockholder in a corporation has
any bearing upon the question here involved. Another reason assigned is that
the value of the old stock held is reduced approximately by the value of the
new stock received, so that the stockholder after receipt of the stock dividend
has no more than he had before it was paid. That is equally true whether
the dividend be paid in cash or in other property; for instance, bonds, scrip
or preferred stock of the company. The payment from profits of a large
cash dividend, and even a small one, customarily lowers the then market
value of stock because the undivided property represented by each share has
been correspondingly reduced. The argument which appears to be most
strongly urged for the stockholders is, that when a stock dividend is made,
no portion of the assets of the company is thereby segregated for the stock
holder. But does the issue of new bonds or of preferred stock created for
use as a dividend result in any segregation of assets for the stockholder?
In each case he receives a piece of paper which entitles him to certain rights
in the undivided property. Clearly segregation of assets in a physical sense
is not an essential of income. The year’s gains of a partner is taxable as
income, although there, likewise, no segregation of his share in the gains
from that of his partners is had.
The objection that there has been no segregation is presented also in
another form. It is argued that until there is a segregation, the stockholder
cannot know whether he has really received gains; since the gains may be
invested in plant or merchandise or other property and perhaps be later lost.
But is not this equally true of the share of a partner in the year’s profits of
the firm or, indeed, of the profits of the individual who is engaged in busi
ness alone ? And is it not true, also, when dividends are paid in cash ? The
gains of a business, whether conducted by an individual, by a firm or by a
corporation, are ordinarily reinvested in large part. Many a cash dividend
honestly declared as a distribution of profits proves later to have been paid
out of capital, because errors in forecast prevent correct ascertainment of
values. Until a business adventure has been completely liquidated, it can
never be determined with certainty whether there have been profits unless the
returns have at least exceeded the capital originally invested. Business men,
dealing with the problem practically, fix necessarily periods and rules for
determining whether there have been net profits—that is, income or gains.
They protect themselves from being seriously misled by adopting a system
of depreciation charges and reserves. Then they act upon their own deter
mination whether profits have been made. Congress in legislating has wisely
adopted their practices as its own rules of action.
Third: The government urges that it would have been within the power
of congress to have taxed as income of the stockholder his pro rata share
of undistributed profits earned, even if no stock dividend representing it had
been paid. Strong reasons may be assigned for such a view. See The
Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1. The undivided share of a partner in the
year’s undisturbed profits of his firm is taxable as income of the partner,
although the share in the gain is not evidenced by any action taken by the
firm. Why may not the stockholder’s interest in the gains of the company?
The law finds no difficulty in disregarding the corporate fiction whenever
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that is deemed necessary to attain a just result. Linn Timber Co. v. United
States, 236 U. S. 574; see Morawetz on Corporations (2d ed.), secs. 227-231;
Cook on Corporations (7th ed.), secs. 663, 664. The stockholder’s interest
in the property of the corporation differs, not fundamentally but in form
only, from the interest of a partner in the property of the firm. There is
much authority for the proposition that, under our law, a partnership or
joint stock company is just as distinct and palpable an entity in the idea of
the law, as distinguished from the individuals composing it, as is a corpora
tion. No reason appears why congress, in legislating under a grant of power
so comprehensive as that authorizing the levy of an income tax, should be
limited by the particular view of the relation of the stockholder to the cor
poration and its property which may, in the absence of legislation, have
been taken by this court. But we have no occasion to decide the question
whether congress might have taxed to the stockholder his undivided share
of the corporation’s earnings. For congress has in this act limited the in
come tax to that share of the stockholder in the earnings which is, in effect,
distributed by means of the stock dividend paid. In other words, to render
the stockholder taxable there must be both earnings made and a dividend
paid. Neither earnings without dividend—nor a dividend without earnings—
subjects the stockholder to taxation under the revenue act of 1916.
Fourth: The equivalency of all dividends representing profits, whether
paid in cash or in stock, is so complete that serious question of the taxability
of stock dividends would probably never have been made, if congress had
undertaken to tax only those dividends which represented profits earned
during the year in which the dividend was paid or in the year preceding.
But this court, construing liberally not only the constitutional grant of power
but also the revenue act of 1913, held that congress might tax, and had
taxed, to the stockholder dividends received during the year, although earned
by the company long before, and even prior to the adoption of the sixteenth
amendment. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339. That rule, if indiscriminately
applied to all stock dividends representing profits earned, might, in view of
corporate practice, have worked considerable hardship, and have raised
serious questions. Many corporations, without legally capitalizing any part
of their profits, had assigned definitely some part or all of the annual
balances remaining after paying the usual cash dividends, to the uses to
which permanent capital is ordinarily applied. Some of the corporations
doing this transferred such balances on their books to “surplus” account—
distinguishing between such permanent “surplus” and the “undivided profits”
account. Other corporations, without this formality, had assumed that the
annual accumulating balances carried as undistributed profits were to be
treated as capital permanently invested in the business. And still others,
without definite assumption of any kind, had so used undivided profits for
capital purposes. To have made the revenue law apply retroactively so as
to reach such accumulated profits, if and whenever it should be deemed
desirable to capitalize them legally by the issue of additional stock distributed
as a dividend to stockholders, would have worked great injustice. Congress
endeavored in the revenue act of 1916 to guard against any serious hardship
which might otherwise have arisen from making taxable stock dividends
representing accumulated profits. It did not limit the taxability to stock
dividends representing profits earned within the tax year or in the year
preceding; but it did limit taxability to such dividends representing profits
earned since March 1, 1913. Thereby stockholders were given notice that
their share also in undistributed profits accumulating thereafter was at some
time to be taxed as income. And congress sought by section 3 to discourage
the postponement of distribution for the illegitimate purpose of evading
liability to surtaxes.
Fifth: The decision of this court, that earnings made before the
adoption of the sixteenth amendment but paid out in cash dividend after its
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adoption were taxable as income of the stockholder, involved a very liberal
construction of the amendment. To hold now that earnings both made and
paid out after the adoption of the sixteenth amendment cannot be taxed
as income of the stockholder, if paid in the form of a stock dividend, in
volves an exceeding narrow construction of it. As said by Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 446: “To construe
the power so as to impair its efficacy, would tend to defeat an object, in the
attainment of which the American public took, and justly took, the strong
interest which arose from a full conviction of its necessity.”
No decision heretofore rendered by this court requires us to hold that
congress, in providing for the taxation of stock dividends, exceeded the
power conferred upon it by the sixteenth amendment. The two cases mainly
relied upon to show that this was beyond the power of congress are Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, which involved a question not of constitutional power
but of statutory construction, and Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, which
involved a question arising between life-tenant and remainderman. So far
as concerns Towne v. Eisner we have only to bear in mind what was there
said (p. 425) : “But it is not necessarily true that income means the same
thing in the constitution and the [an] act.” Gibbons v. Mahon is even less an
authority for a narrow construction of the power to tax incomes conferred
by the sixteenth amendment. In that case the court was required to determine
how, in the administration of an estate in the District of Columbia, a stock
dividend, representing profits, received after the decedent’s death, should be
disposed of as between life-tenant and remainderman. The question was in
essence: What shall the intention of the testator be presumed to have been ?
On this question there was great diversity of opinion and practice in the
courts of English-speaking countries. Three well-defined rules were then
competing for acceptance; two of these involves an arbitrary rule of dis
tribution, the third equitable apportionment. See Cook on Corporations
(7th ed.), sections 552-558.
1. The so-called English rule, declared in 1799, by Brander v. Brander,
4 Ves. Jr. 800, that a dividend representing profits, whether in cash, stock
or other property, belongs to the life-tenant if it was a regular or ordinary
dividend, and belongs to the remainderman if it was an extraordinary
dividend.
2. The so-called Massachusetts rule, declared in 1868 by Minot v. Paine,
99 Mass. 101, that a dividend representing profits, whether regular, ordinary
or extraordinary, if in cash belongs to the life-tenant, and if in stock belongs
to the remainderman.
3. The so-called Pennsylvania rule declared in 1857 by Earp’s Appeal,
28 Pa. St. 368, that where a stock dividend is paid, the court shall inquire
into the circumstances under which the fund had been earned and accumu
lated out of which the dividend, whether a regular, an ordinary or an ex
traordinary one, was paid. If it finds that the stock dividend was paid out of
profits earned since the decedent’s death, the stock dividend belongs to the
life-tenant; if the court finds that the stock dividend was paid from capital
or from profits earned before the decedent’s death, the stock dividend belongs
to the remainderman.
This court adopted in Gibbons v. Mahon as the rule of administration for
the District of Columbia the so-called Massachusetts rule, the opinion being
delivered in 1890 by Mr. Justice Gray. Since then the same question has
come up for decision in many of the states. The so-called Massachusetts
rule, although approved by this court, has found favor in only a few states.
The so-called Pennsylvania rule, on the other hand, has been adopted since
by so many of the states (including New York and California) that it has
come to be known as the “American rule.” Whether, in view of these facts
and the practical results of the operation of the two rules as shown by the
experience of the thirty years which have elapsed since the decision in
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Gibbons v. Mahon, it might be desirable for this court to reconsider the
question there decided, as some other courts have done (see 29 Harvard Law
Review, 551), we have no occasion to consider in this case. For, as this
court there pointed out (p. 560), the question involved was one “between the
owners of successive interests in particular shares,” and not, as in Bailey v.
Railroad Co., 22 Wall. 604, a question “between the corporation and the
government, and [which] depended upon the terms of a statute carefully
framed to prevent corporations from evading payment of the tax upon their
their earnings.”
We have, however, not merely argument, we have examples which should
convince us that “there is no inherent, necessary and immutable reason why
stock dividends should always be treated as capital.” Tax Commissioner v.
Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 533. The supreme judicial court of Massachusetts
has steadfastly adhered, despite ever-renewed protest, to the rule that every
stock dividend is, as between life-tenant and remainderman, capital and not
income. But in construing the Massachusetts income-tax amendment, which
is substantially identical with the federal amendment, that court held that
the legislature was thereby empowered to levy an income tax upon stock
dividends representing profits. The courts of England have, with some re
laxation, adhered to their rule that every extraordinary dividend is, as
between life-tenant and remainderman, to be deemed capital. But in 1913
the judicial committee of the privy council held that a stock dividend repre
senting accumulated profits was taxable like an ordinary cash dividend,
Swan Brewery Company, Limited, v. The King, L. R. (1914) A. C. 231.
In dismissing the appeal these words of the chief justice of the supreme
court of Western Australia were quoted (p. 236) which show that the facts
involved were identical with those in the case at bar: “Had the company
distributed the £101,450 among the shareholders, and had the shareholders
repaid such sums to the company as the price of the 81,160 new shares, the
duty on the £101,450 would clearly have been payable. Is not this virtually
the effect of what was actually done? I think it is.”
Sixth: If stock dividends representing profits are held exempt from
taxation under the sixteenth amendment, the owners of the most successful
businesses in America will, as the facts in this case illustrate, be able to
escape taxation on a large part of what is actually their income. So far as
their profits are represented by stock received as dividends they will pay
these taxes not upon their income but only upon the income of their income.
That such a result was intended by the people of the United States when
adopting the sixteenth amendment is inconceivable. Our sole duty is to
ascertain their intent as therein expressed. In terse, comprehensive language
befitting the constitution, they empowered congress “to lay and collect taxes
on incomes from whatever source derived.” They intended to include thereby
everything which by reasonable understanding can fairly be regarded as
income. That stock dividends representing profits are so regarded, not only
by the plain people but by investors and financiers, and by most of the courts
of the country, is shown, beyond peradventure, by their acts and by their
utterances. It seems to me clear, therefore, that congress possesses the
power which it exercised to make dividends representing profits, taxable as
income, whether the medium in which the dividend is paid be cash or stock,
and that it may define, as it has done, what dividends representing profits
shall be deemed income. It surely is not clear that the enactment exceeds
the power granted by the sixteenth amendment. And, as this court has so
often said, the high prerogative of declaring an act of congress invalid,
should never be exercised except in a clear case. “It is but a decent respect
due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body,
by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity, until its
violation of the constitution is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ogden
v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 213, 270.
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Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the following opinion:
I think that Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, was right in its reasoning
and result and that on sound principles the stock dividend was not income.
But it was clearly intimated in that case that the construction of the statute
then before the court might be different from that of the constitution. 245
U. S. 425. I think that the word “incomes” in the sixteenth amendment should
be read in “a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of
its adoption.” Bishop v. State, 149 Ind. 223, 230; State v. Butler, 70 Fla.
102, 133. For it was for public adoption that it was proposed. M’Culloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407. The known purpose of this amendment was
to get rid of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes, and I cannot
doubt that most people not lawyers would suppose when they voted for it
that they put a question like the present to rest. I am of opinion that the
amendment justifies the tax. See Tax Commissioner v. Putnam, 227 Mass.
522, 532, 533.
Mr. Justice Day concurs in this opinion.
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